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and the Informal Economy




It is widely agreed that the opportunities for expansion of aggregate employment
in the OECD area must be sought mainly in the private service sector. Thus,
because of budgetary problems and voter resistance to higher tax rates, the scope
for further expansion of public sector employment seems limited in most OECD
countries. Furthermore, the primary sector will undoubtedly continue to release
labour resources and, with normal growth rates, there is little prospect of a
secular rise in manufacturing employment, since the increase in demand for
manufactures is likely to be met through increases in labour productivity. In
particular, the ongoing shifts in the international division of labour and the
associated transition to the ‘knowledge-based economy’ within the OECD are
likely to destroy a large number of manufacturing jobs for unskilled and low-
skilled workers in the OECD area.
In recent years, many policymakers have expressed the hope that these job
losses may be compensated by the creation of new private sector service jobs for
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those workers whose skills are hard to upgrade through training and education
programmes. The production of consumer services delivered to the household
sector (as opposed to services delivered to the business sector) is often rather
intensive in the use of unskilled labour. However, in many western countries, the
growth of the consumer service sector seems to have been hampered by serious
competition from do-it-yourself activities and from services produced in the
‘black’ underground economy which are not burdened with the high tax rates
levied on the ‘white’ service sector.
In the case of Denmark, it has been estimated that the increase in direct and
indirect tax rates between 1967 and 1992 has, ceteris paribus, reduced the
demand for white consumer services by 25 per cent by causing white services to
be crowded out by services delivered from the informal economy (Heinesen,
1994, p. 37).
2 Other empirical studies for Denmark have tended to confirm the
impression of a significant growth of the informal economy during the last
decades. Figure 1 provides a measure of the trend in black labour market activity
since 1980, estimated on the basis of questionnaires. Apart from a period in the
mid-1980s when employment opportunities in the official labour market
improved significantly, there has been a marked rise in the amount of work
carried out in the black markets. Black labour seems to be particularly
widespread in the consumer service sector, especially in the repair and
maintenance of dwellings and of consumer durables. In the early 1990s, Viby
Mogensen (1992) estimated that, on conservative assumptions, the total number
of black working hours amounted to about 5 per cent of the total number of
hours worked in the official labour market.
FIGURE 1
Time Spent on Black Labour per Danish Person Aged 20-69 Years
Source: The Rockwool Foundation Research Unit
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After adjusting for demographic changes, Körmendi (1990) also found
evidence of a significant rise in the amount of unpaid work carried out in Danish
homes between 1964 and 1987, despite the facts that Danish women entered the
official labour market on a large scale during that period and that much
household work became mechanised due to the introduction of electric
appliances etc. According to Körmendi’s estimates, the time spent on unpaid
work in the home made up about two-thirds of the total time spent in the labour
market for the average adult Dane in 1987.
3
In summary, it seems that very substantial labour resources are tied up in the
informal economy. Moreover, it appears that part of the growth of the informal
sector can be attributed to the rising tax wedges which have made it increasingly
difficult for the white service sector to compete with informal service production
which escapes taxation, legally or illegally. In Denmark — and in some other
OECD countries as well — this observation has led to the suggestion that the
consumer service sector should be granted special tax concessions or direct
subsidies to compensate for the competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the informal
economy.
4 The hypothesis is that such a policy could create more service jobs in
the official economy and could help to twist labour demand in favour of those
groups of low- skilled workers who are currently particularly hard hit by
unemployment. In fact, the Danish government has already experimented with
selective subsidisation of consumer services on a small scale by introducing
subsidies to repair and maintenance of private homes as well as subsidies to
market-based provision of certain household services such as cleaning and
gardening.
Many observers have tended to see the proposed tax concessions or direct
subsidies to consumer services as a rather poor substitute for labour market
policies aimed more directly at reducing structural unemployment. However, it
may be more appropriate to consider the problem in the perspective offered by
the theory of optimal taxation.
5 This theory suggests that, in order to minimise
the distorting substitution effects induced by the tax system, the government
should impose relatively low tax rates on those white activities that can easily be
replaced by services produced in the informal economy beyond the reach of the
tax collector. As Harberger (1990, p. 8) has put it, ‘If a package of close
substitutes contains some important items that by their nature are difficult to tax,
then the course of prudence may well be to leave the whole package in the
untaxed sector rather than cause sharp tax-induced substitutions by introducing a
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tax just on a part of the group’. This observation might also justify a direct
subsidy to consumer services to neutralise the effect of the tax wedge, if it is
deemed desirable to avoid the ‘tax expenditure’ implied by tax exemption.
The present paper is a first attempt at analysing the effects on employment
and welfare of selective subsidies to consumer services by means of an applied
general equilibrium model of the interactions between the formal and informal
economies.
6 At the theoretical level, our model seeks to combine ideas from the
literature on income tax evasion — for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
Cowell (1985 and 1990), Watson (1985), Kesselman (1989), Jung, Snow and
Trandel (1994) and Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette (1994) — and the literature
on the effects of taxation on the allocation of labour between home production
and market production, exemplified by Boskin (1975) and Piggott and Whalley
(1994). While these contributions focus either on the underground economy or
on the allocation of time between home production and market production, our
model provides a broader picture by considering simultaneously the allocation of
time between leisure, work in the home, work in the official labour market and
work in the underground economy, and by distinguishing between service
production and production of other goods. The price to be paid for this added
complexity is that we cannot unambiguously predict the qualitative effects of
taxes and subsidies on the basis of the analytical solution to our model. Hence
we have to resort to numerical simulations. On the other hand, this has the
advantage that it allows a quantification of policy effects and enables us to
analyse in quantitative terms the sensitivity of our results to changes in strategic
parameter values.
We are aware of only one paper (Graafland, 1990) that applies a computable
general equilibrium model to the study of tax effects on resource allocation
between the formal and informal economies, allowing for home production as
well as activity in the black labour market. However, Graafland’s model does not
contain a distinction between consumer services and other sectors of the market
economy, a distinction which is crucial for the present purpose.
As a prelude to our numerical analysis, the next section briefly reviews
alternative possible instruments of subsidisation. Section III then discusses the
qualitative effects of consumer service subsidies on employment and
unemployment, while Section IV describes the nature of the welfare costs and
benefits of subsidies. Following this qualitative analysis, Sections V, VI and VII
outline a computable general equilibrium model of the Danish economy designed
to quantify the effects of subsidising white consumer services. In Section VIII,
this model is used to estimate the optimal subsidy to the consumer service sector,
while Section IX simulates the effects of subsidisation on the economy under
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alternative assumptions regarding the mode of government finance. Section X
illustrates the sensitivity of the welfare effects to changes in some important
parameters in the model, while the final section summarises our conclusions and
indicates some directions for future research.
II. ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS OF SUBSIDISATION
Subsidies to the consumer service sector could take the form of tax concessions
or of direct subsidies. Tax concessions could consist of exemption of consumer
service firms from VAT and from payroll taxes and social security contributions.
Alternatively, the government could allow households to deduct part or all of
their expenditure on the purchase of white consumer services from the personal
income tax base. Direct subsidies could take the form of a subsidy to consumer
service sector firms in proportion to their total service sales, a subsidy in
proportion to the total payroll of these firms or a subsidy in proportion to the
number of service hours worked in the consumer’s home.
There are several administrative and political difficulties associated with all
of these policy instruments, but we do not intend to discuss these problems in the
present paper.
7 Instead, we ask whether there is indeed an economic case for
selective subsidisation of consumer services when one abstracts from the
administrative and political complexities. Of course, in a complete analysis, one
would have to include the administrative costs and account for possible abuses
of subsidies etc. If these sorts of costs are believed to exceed the estimated
welfare gains from subsidisation reported in this paper, the subsidisation policy
would not be worthwhile pursuing.
III. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The various types of subsidies mentioned above all work through the same
channel, namely by lowering the relative consumer price of white consumer
services. Households are thereby induced to substitute consumer services for the
consumption of other goods and services. Since the production of consumer
services tends to be more labour-intensive and less import-intensive than other
forms of production, this twist of consumer demand tends to increase the
aggregate demand for labour, thus stimulating total employment. Hence there
will be a ‘demand twist effect’ on employment. It should be noted that the
positive twist effect on employment will emerge even if the subsidies are fully
financed, i.e. even if total household disposable incomes do not rise on impact.
The lower relative price of white consumer services also implies that part of
the work carried out in the home and in the black labour market will be
transformed to work in the official labour market. In other words, the supply of
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labour to the white market will increase, as employment opportunities in the
black market deteriorate and as consumers spend less time on home production.
Through a dampening of wage inflation, this rise in labour supply will gradually
lead to a further increase in total employment. Thus we may speak of a ‘labour
supply effect’ on aggregate employment. Of course, some of the increase in the
registered volume of employment in the official labour market will merely
reflect the reallocation of labour from the black to the white labour market and
will not represent a rise in total market employment in the economy as a whole.
In the shorter term, unemployment may be expected to fall as a result of the
twist effect on labour demand. However, in the longer run, the fall in registered
unemployment will tend to be offset by the increased supply of labour to the
official labour market. If the hypothesis of a ‘natural’ rate of unemployment is
correct, there will be a permanent fall in unemployment only in so far as the
subsidisation of consumer services succeeds in lowering the natural (or
‘structural’) unemployment rate. It is likely that such a fall in the natural rate will
in fact materialise, in so far as the production of consumer services tends to be
relatively intensive in the use of low-skilled labour with an above-average
unemployment incidence.
8 However, it should be added that the present version
of the simulation model presented below is not well suited to capture such an
effect on the structure of labour demand, since the model contains no explicit
distinction between skilled and unskilled labour.
IV. THE WELFARE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SUBSIDISATION
If the subsidies actually lead to a permanent fall in involuntary unemployment,
consumers will reap a welfare gain from a reduced degree of rationing in the
official labour market.
There is also another important source of welfare gain. Because of the tax
wedge, the (value of the) marginal product of labour must be higher in the white
service sector for that sector to be able to compete with the untaxed service
production in the informal economy. A reallocation of labour away from home
production and black service production towards the white service sector
therefore generates a productivity gain which provides a basis for higher overall
consumption of goods and services and/or higher consumption of leisure.
On the cost side of the cost–benefit calculus, we find two items. First, the
selective subsidies will distort competition between the white service sector and
the rest of the white economy, enabling service-producing firms to survive even
if their factor productivity is lower than the productivity of similar factors
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employed in the production of other goods. Second, if the subsidies have to be
financed by distortionary taxes, there is an additional efficiency loss from the
required rise in these taxes.
Despite these efficiency costs, there are reasons to believe that some positive
amount of subsidisation will indeed be optimal, because the present tax system
discriminates heavily in favour of the informal economy.
9 The optimal subsidy to
consumer services (in the form of tax concessions or direct subsidies) will
balance the marginal gain from a reallocation of resources away from the
informal economy against the marginal cost of shifting resources away from the
rest of the white economy towards the service sector.
Critics have argued that selective subsidies targeted at consumer services
represent an inappropriate policy response to the problem of structural
unemployment. According to this view, policymakers should instead attack the
unemployment problem in a more direct manner by concentrating on measures
that will improve the flexibility of labour markets. However, it is worth noting
that even if labour markets were flexible enough to ensure full employment, the
tax system would still imply a distortion of resource allocation in favour of the
informal economy. Even with a fully flexible labour market, there could thus be
a second-best case for some subsidisation of white consumer services.
At the same time, the simulation results reported below suggest that the case
for selective subsidisation of consumer services does in fact become weaker, the
greater the degree of labour market flexibility. To a large extent, the desirability
of subsidising consumer services will thus depend on the likelihood that the
unemployment problem may be alleviated by other (politically viable) means.
V. A SIMULATION MODEL OF THE ‘WHITE’, ‘GREEN’ AND
‘BLACK’ ECONOMIES
The analysis above suggests that subsidisation of consumer services could
indeed generate positive employment and welfare effects. However, to justify the
administrative costs, these gains would have to be non-negligible.
Thus there is an obvious need to quantify the likely effects of subsidies to the
consumer service sector. Unfortunately, the existing macroeconometric models
are not well suited for this purpose, since they incorporate neither a black sector
nor a ‘green’ sector describing the do-it-yourself activities of private households.
The Economic Policy Research Unit at Copenhagen Business School has
therefore initiated the development of an alternative simulation model which
attempts to illuminate the interaction between the white, green and black
economies. The structure of the ‘first generation’ of this computable general
                                                                                                                                   
9 At least this discrimination is fairly obvious in the case of Denmark, where small and medium-sized
enterprises do not enjoy any substantial tax privileges.Fiscal Studies
78
equilibrium model is illustrated in Figure 2.
10 It can be seen that the model
comprises a household sector, a private business sector, a public sector and a
foreign sector.
The household sector includes two types of households: the white households
may be thought of as rather specialised white-collar workers who do not have
any practical possibilities of engaging in black labour. These households allocate
their time between leisure, work in the official labour market and service
production in the home (do-it-yourself activities). By contrast, the black
households also have the possibility of working in the black market for consumer
services, in addition to spending time on leisure, on work in the white market
and on producing services in the home. The black households face a (low)
positive probability of being detected by the tax authorities if they engage in
black labour. If they are detected, they will be fined. When deciding their level
of black market activity, the black households take into account the probability
of detection and the associated fine.
11
The business sector consists of firms producing consumer services and firms
producing other goods and services (the latter will be denoted ‘C-firms’, for
brevity). Labour is taken to be the only variable factor of production, and both
types of firms demand labour from both types of households. The two types of
labour are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other. On the other hand,
the white consumer services are assumed to be a perfect substitute for services
delivered from the black market, which in turn are considered a perfect substitute
for services produced in the home. The domestic C-sector exports part of its
output of consumer goods to the foreign sector and sells its remaining output to
domestic consumers and the domestic government. Households also consume
imported goods, which are imperfect substitutes for consumer goods produced at
home.
The public sector levies a tax on wage income, a tax on business profits, an
indirect tax on consumer services and an indirect tax on other goods and
services. The government uses tax revenues to finance its purchase of labour
services from the two types of households and to finance the purchase of goods
as well as expenses on unemployment benefits and other transfers to households.
The government may also decide to grant various forms of subsidies to the
production or purchase of consumer services. The wage income tax is modelled
as a simple linear tax with a constant marginal tax rate combined with an
exemption which introduces some progressivity, enabling us to distinguish the
average from the marginal tax rate. Since payroll taxes and social security taxes
levied on employers are virtually non- existent in Denmark, they have been left
out of the model. A flat 5 per cent tax on gross labour income has recently been
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introduced to finance part of government expenditure on unemployment benefits
and ‘active’ labour market policies. We have simply incorporated this tax in our
estimate of the average value of the total marginal tax rate on labour income.
FIGURE 2
Model of the Interaction between the White, Green and Black Markets
Notation:
Cd/cd  =  Consumption of domestic goods
Ci/ci   =  Consumption of imported goods
S/s     =  Consumption of services from the market
H/h = Home-produced  services
Lm/lm  =  Time spent on work in the white market
Lh/lh   =  Time spent on home production
lb =  Time spent on work in the black market
X =  Export of consumption goods
The behavioural relationships in the model are derived on the assumption that
households maximise their (expected) utility, subject to their budget constraints,
and that firms maximise their profits, subject to their production functions.
12 We
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input being a CES-index of labour input from the two types of households.
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assume that perfect competition prevails in the markets for goods and services.
With regard to labour market behaviour, we distinguish two variants of the
model. In the so-called ‘fix-wage’ variant, we assume that wage-earners in the
official labour market demand and obtain a fixed consumer real wage which is
set at a level generating involuntary unemployment in that market. By contrast,
the ‘flex-wage’ version of the model assumes that the real wage is fully flexible,
adjusting to eliminate any excess supply or excess demand in the labour market.
The fix-wage variant may be interpreted as a model of the short and medium
term, whereas the flex-wage variant may be seen as a model of the long run,
since real wage adjustment tends to be a time-consuming process. However,
even if the two model variants are applied to different time horizons, there is
hardly any doubt that the fix-wage model underestimates the degree of real wage
flexibility found in real-world labour markets, whereas the flex-wage model
undoubtedly overestimates the degree of labour market flexibility. We therefore
prefer to see the two model versions as alternative (extreme) bench-mark cases
that delineate an interval within which the effects of subsidisation are likely to
fall.
Since the fix-wage model applies mainly to the short and medium term, we
take the distribution of the population between white and black households to be
exogenously given in this model variant. On the other hand, because of the long-
run character of the flex-wage model, we assume in this case that the allocation
of the population across the two household types adjusts endogenously until
black and white households achieve the same level of utility.
The model only describes the production of goods and services for
consumption. Thus we abstract from saving and investment, since we are
concerned with the allocation of resources between the formal and informal
economies at any point in time rather than with the allocation of total
consumption over time. Because the private sector does not accumulate assets,
the model cannot describe the dynamics of government debt accumulation, and
hence we assume that the government budget is always balanced. Furthermore,
the current account of the balance of payments — which by definition equals the
difference between saving and investment — is always zero in the model
because saving and investment are both zero. Consequently, the model can be
said to illustrate those employment and welfare gains that are consistent with an
unchanged government budget position and an unchanged balance-of-payments
position.
VI. CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL
In Table 1, we have indicated those white consumer services that we consider to
compete most directly with do-it-yourself services and services delivered from
the black market, and that are therefore a potential target for subsidies. We have
included the consumption of restaurant services, since these are an alternative toSubsidising Consumer Services
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cooking and dining at home. It is seen that white consumer services currently
make up about 15 per cent of total registered private consumption in Denmark.
TABLE 1
Consumption of Private Consumer Services in Denmark, 1992
Per cent
Consumption category Proportion of total
private consumption
Repair and maintenance of dwellings 3.6
Repair of domestic electrical appliances 0.2
Repair and maintenance of automobiles 3.8
Repair of radio, TV etc. 0.2




Consumer services in total 14.5
Source: Danish national accounts, Danmarks Statistik.
The parameters of our simulation model include a number of substitution
elasticities, productivity parameters and budget and wage shares characterising
consumer preferences and producer technology. In addition, the model
incorporates several government policy instruments. The values of these
parameters have been chosen such that the equilibrium of our fix-wage model
reproduces a reasonably precise picture of the relevant relative magnitudes in the
Danish economy in the early 1990s. We calibrated the model on the basis of the
fix-wage variant because the Danish labour market appears to have been
characterised by a high level of involuntary unemployment in the early 1990s.
The parameter values from the calibrated fix-wage model were then carried over
to the flex-wage model.
Table 2 indicates the estimated empirical figures for some strategic private
sector variables as well as the corresponding figures emerging in the bench-mark
equilibrium in the two variants of our model. Both versions of the model are
seen to imply quite realistic levels of consumption of consumer services. The
fix-wage model also generates realistic levels of unemployment and of black
labour. On the other hand, the time spent on home production seems to be much
shorter in the model than in the real world. However, the model incorporates
only those home- produced services that households consider to be perfect
substitutes for services delivered from the market. It is obviously very difficult to
estimate the proportion of unpaid work in the home that is accounted for by theFiscal Studies
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production of these services. Still, it can be shown that the taste and technology
parameters that determine the amount of home production in our model also
determine the implicit wage elasticity of labour supply to the official labour
market. We therefore chose these parameter values so as to generate an
(uncompensated) long-run wage elasticity of labour supply equal to 0.1,
corresponding roughly to Smith’s (1990) empirical estimate of the long-run
labour supply elasticity in Denmark. The parameter values derived through this
procedure turned out to imply a level of home production corresponding to the
top figures in the last two columns of Table 2. As already suggested, these
figures may be seen as a model estimate of that part of home production that is a









Fix-wage model Flex-wage model
Private sector
Time spent on home production as a
percentage of time worked in the official
labour market
66 12.1 3.6
Time spent on black labour as a
percentage of time worked in the official
labour market
55 . 6 1 . 0
Registered unemployment rate 12 11.8 6.0
Consumption of consumer services as a
percentage of total private consumption
15 15.1 16.3
Public sector
Public consumption as a percentage of
GDP
26 25.6 21.6
Marginal tax rate on labour income 56 56.0 56.0
Effective tax rate on profit income 18 18.0 18.0
Indirect tax rate on consumer services 25 25.0 25.0
Indirect tax rate on other goods and
services
32 32.0 32.0
a Rounded figures.Subsidising Consumer Services
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Comparing the first and third columns of Table 2, we see that the level of
activity in the informal economy is much lower in the flex-wage model than it
appeared to be in Denmark in the early 1990s. The basic reason for this
difference is that the real wage adjusts to eliminate all involuntary
unemployment in the flex-wage model. Thus the registered unemployment rate
of 6 per cent in the third column represents an estimate only of ‘voluntary’
unemployment, e.g. search unemployment and normal ‘frictional’
unemployment. When households can sell all the labour services they want in
the official labour market, they have less incentive to engage in home production
and black labour in order to maintain their living standards. According to our
model, the level of activity in the informal economy therefore falls significantly
when households are no longer ‘rationed’ in the white labour market. This seems
consistent with the empirical finding of Lemieux et al. (1994) that labour supply
to the underground economy is very sensitive to the net earnings obtainable in
the official labour market (although these authors do not explicitly allow for
rationing in the white labour market).
Apart from being affected by the wage and price elasticities of labour supply,
the effects of subsidising consumer services can also be expected to depend on
the relative price elasticity of demand for such services. In the model, we have
chosen parameter values that generate an implicit long-run price elasticity of
service demand equal to minus one, corresponding to the estimated long-run
price elasticity of service demand in the Danish macroeconometric model
ADAM.
It should be added that the model is only designed to provide a description of
the intersectoral allocation of labour in the Danish economy; it cannot reproduce
the national income accounts very accurately since there is no saving and
investment going on. However, the relative size of the public sector and the
structure of private consumption implied by our calibration of the model
correspond quite closely to the Danish national income statistics.
VII. FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS
In the background report underlying this paper (Frederiksen et al., 1994), we
have applied the model described above to estimate the effects of several
different forms of subsidies to consumer services. Since all of the subsidies work
by reducing the relative price of consumer services, their qualitative effects are
rather similar, so in the present paper we will focus mainly on the effects of a
wage subsidy to firms in the consumer service sector. Furthermore, we shall
consider only two alternative methods of financing the subsidy: financing
through cuts in government transfer payments and financing through a rise in the
distortionary indirect tax rate on other goods and services.
Our calculations assume that a rise in labour supply to the official labour
market leads to a corresponding rise in the number of work hours covered by theFiscal Studies
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unemployment insurance system. We also assume that any rise in the average
wage rate in the official labour market induces a proportionate rise in the rate of
unemployment benefit. These conservative assumptions are made to avoid
overestimating the government’s saving on unemployment benefits when labour
resources are shifted from the informal to the formal economy.
Total public sector employment and government purchases of goods and
services from the private sector are kept constant throughout the analysis.
Because consumer utility functions are explicitly specified in the model, it is
possible to calculate the effects of government policy on consumer welfare. We
measure the welfare effects by the so-called equivalent variation, defined in
Varian (1984, p. 264). The equivalent variation indicates the hypothetical change
in (lump- sum) income that would have the same welfare effect as the policy
change considered, given the prices and wages prevailing before the policy
change. In other words, the equivalent variation measures the exogenous rise in
income that would be equivalent to the effect of the policy change from the
viewpoint of consumers.
VIII. THE OPTIMAL WAGE SUBSIDY
By simulating our model, we found that all the types of subsidies mentioned in
Section II will generate a welfare gain to consumers, provided they are not
applied in excessive doses. The gross marginal welfare gain from subsidisation
stems from the rise in labour productivity associated with a reallocation of
resources from the informal to the formal economy, and from the fall in
involuntary unemployment (the latter gain arises only in the fix-wage model).
The marginal welfare cost of subsidisation consists of the efficiency loss of
shifting resources from the rest of the formal economy to the subsidised (and
therefore less productive) service sector, plus the efficiency loss from the rise in
tax rates, if the subsidies have to be financed by distortionary taxes. Clearly, the
maximum net welfare gain — and hence the optimal degree of subsidisation —
is achieved where the gross marginal welfare gain is just balanced by the
marginal welfare cost.
In Figures 3 and 4, we illustrate the net welfare gains associated with
alternative levels of a wage (payroll) subsidy granted to firms producing
consumer services. The calculations in the figures are based on the flex-wage
model.
13 Figure 3 indicates the welfare gains when the subsidy is financed
through a reduction of ‘other transfers’, i.e. government transfers other than
unemployment benefits. In this case, a maximum welfare gain of 0.74 per cent of
private consumption can be reaped by setting the wage subsidy rate at 36 per
cent. In our model, the ‘other transfers’ have a lump-sum character, and Figure 3
                                                                                                                                   
13 It seems appropriate that the level of subsidisation should be based on long-run considerations. This is why
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therefore essentially assumes that the subsidy is financed by a non-distortionary
government policy instrument. Indeed, since many transfer programmes tend to
have distortionary incentive effects in the real world, the efficiency gains from
subsidisation could even be greater than shown in Figure 3 if the subsidy is
financed by cuts in transfers.
FIGURE 3
Welfare Gain (as a percentage of private consumption) from a Wage Subsidy
Financed by a Cut in Other Government Transfers
(Flex-Wage Model)
In practice, however, concerns about income distribution effects will often
prevent governments from financing subsidies by lowering transfers to
households. We therefore show, in Figure 4, the welfare gains in the alternative
case where the subsidy is financed through a rise in indirect taxes on goods and
services other than consumer services. Because this method of finance tends to
exacerbate the distortion of resource allocation between the white service sector
and the rest of the business sector, the maximum achievable welfare gain is now
only 0.51 per cent of private consumption, and the optimum rate of wage subsidy
is only 28 per cent.
To put this figure in perspective, it is worth noting that tax rates and
unemployment benefits at the level prevailing in Denmark drive a wedge of
about 86 per cent between the marginal productivity of labour in the white
service sector and the marginal product of labour in home production in the
initial equilibrium of our model. In principle, this means that if he is able to
collect unemployment benefits while carrying out home production, it will pay
an average Danish worker to engage in do-it-yourself activity even if this activity
is 1/(1–0.86) ! 7 times less productive at the margin than the corresponding
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cent to white service production will only reduce the combined tax–benefit
wedge in favour of home production from about 86 per cent to about 80 per cent.
Due to the increased distortions between the white service sector and the rest of
the official market economy, it is thus optimal to keep the service subsidy far
below the level that would fully eliminate the tax–benefit wedge in favour of the
informal economy.
FIGURE 4
Welfare Gain (as a percentage of private consumption) from a Wage Subsidy
Financed by Higher Indirect Taxes on Other Goods and Services
(Flex-Wage Model)
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the welfare gain declines fairly rapidly when the
optimal subsidy rate is exceeded and that the potential gain may easily turn into
an actual loss if the subsidy is set at a very high level. This is just an illustration
of the obvious point that it is possible to have ‘too much of a good thing’. Since
there will be considerable uncertainty about the exact position of the welfare
curves depicted in the figures, our analysis suggests that policymakers should
probably be rather cautious and conservative when choosing the level of
subsidisation.
If the government has access to a non-distortionary financing instrument such
as a reduction of the ‘other transfers’ in our model, it can in principle achieve the
maximum welfare gain of 0.74 per cent shown in Figure 3 through several other
types of subsidies that work by reducing the relative consumer price of services.
However, if the subsidy has to be financed by distortionary taxes, our model
implies that a wage subsidy enables policymakers to generate a higher welfare
gain than the other instruments of subsidisation. The reason is that the other
instruments subsidise the total costs of production (including the overhead and
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consumer service production. When all variable costs are labour costs, a wage
subsidy of X per cent will reduce the marginal cost and hence the consumer price
to the same extent as, say, a sales subsidy of X per cent, but the sales subsidy
will be more expensive for the government because it also subsidises the
intramarginal overhead costs. The fixed intramarginal costs will likewise be
subsidised if the government grants VAT exemption to consumer service firms
or if it allows a personal tax deduction for the purchase of consumer services.
Being cheaper, the wage subsidy hence requires a smaller increase in
distortionary taxes and therefore tends to have the most favourable employment
and welfare effects per krone of public expenditure on subsidies. However, it
should be stressed that in a long-run dynamic perspective, there could be
favourable supply-side effects from subsidies that also reduce the overhead costs
of service firms, especially in those areas where the white market has to be
established almost from scratch. Moreover, a wage subsidy would probably have
to be supplemented by a subsidy to the estimated labour income of the self-
employed in the consumer service sector in order not to discriminate against self-
employment in that sector. It is important to bear in mind that our simulation
model does not allow for these complications.
IX. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE OPTIMAL WAGE SUBSIDY
In the scenario depicted in Figure 4, the optimal wage subsidy of 28 per cent
requires a rise in the indirect tax rate on other goods and services of 4.5
percentage points to maintain government budget balance. In Table 3, we have
summarised the simulated effects of a 28 per cent wage subsidy financed by an
increase in indirect taxation of this magnitude.
TABLE 3
Effects of the Optimal (28 per cent) Wage Subsidy to the Consumer Service Sector
a
Percentage change
Variable Flex-wage model Fix-wage model
Time spent on home production -22.5 -33.0
Time spent on black labour -22.6 -25.0
Employment in consumer service sector 36.5 49.8
Employment in other business sectors -6.3 0.4
Total employment in official labour market 1.2 5.9
Leisure time -0.3 -0.8
Registered rate of unemployment
(change in percentage points)
-0.1 -4.1
Welfare gain as a percentage of private
consumption
0.5 3.6
a Financed by 4.5 percentage point increase in the indirect tax rate on other goods and services.Fiscal Studies
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The first column of Table 3 shows the effects emerging in the flex-wage
model. By lowering the relative price of white consumer services, we see that the
subsidy generates a large increase in employment in the white service sector at
the expense of a fall in activity in the informal economy. To some extent, the rise
in white service sector employment also occurs at the expense of a fall in
employment in the rest of the official economy, but total white employment
nevertheless goes up, due to an increase in total labour supply to the official
market. The consumption of leisure falls slightly, because the wage subsidy
enables the service sector to bid up the general level of real wages, thereby
increasing the opportunity cost of leisure. Measured in absolute terms, there is
no drop in registered unemployment, because the model assumes that the extent
of unemployment insurance increases pari passu with the rise in total labour
supply. Yet the unemployment rate falls slightly, due to the increase in the
registered labour force. The welfare gain of 0.5 per cent of private consumption
corresponds to the maximum gain shown in Figure 4.
As indicated in the second column of Table 3, the expansionary effects of the
wage subsidy become considerably stronger in the fix-wage model, since higher
official labour market activity does not drive up the level of real wages in this
variant of the model. In addition to a strong expansion of the white consumer
service sector, we now also observe a slight rise in employment in the rest of the
official economy (the ‘C-sector’). This may seem surprising, since the output of
the C-sector becomes relatively more expensive. However, this negative demand
effect on the C-sector is more than offset by the positive demand effect of rising
real incomes and by the positive supply-side effect of lower nominal wage
claims made possible by the lower price of service consumption.
14 Total official
employment is seen to rise by almost 6 per cent, but the unemployment rate falls
somewhat less, due to increased (notional) labour supply to the white market.
Compared with the flex-wage scenario, the welfare gain is also seen to be
much larger in the fix-wage model, amounting to an impressive 3.6 per cent of
total private consumption.
15 The larger welfare gain can be explained by the
reduction in involuntary unemployment, the greater reallocation from the
informal to the formal economy, and the greater marginal productivity difference
between the formal and informal economies stemming from the fact that
rationing in the official labour market generates additional black labour and do-
it-yourself activity.
It should be noted that the greater rise in official market activity in the fix-
wage model implies a greater automatic improvement of the government budget
(compared with the flex-wage model) so that the 4.5 percentage point increase in
                                                                                                                                   
14 The overall consumer price index (and hence the nominal wage level) falls, because the lower price of
services is not fully offset by a higher consumer price of other goods, even though the indirect tax on these
other goods is raised.
15 This is a weighted average figure. The gain is higher for the white households and lower (but still substantial)
for the black households.Subsidising Consumer Services
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the indirect tax rate on C-sector goods actually generates more revenue than
needed to finance the wage subsidy. The simulations assume that this additional
revenue is transferred back to households in a lump-sum fashion, but in practice
it could, of course, also be used to reduce government debt.
In summary, the effects of subsidising consumer services seem very
favourable in the fix-wage model. Yet, to put these effects in a proper
perspective, it should be kept in mind that more conventional expansionary
policy measures would also tend to have rather attractive effects in a set-up
where large-scale expansion of employment is possible without driving up the
real wage rates claimed by wage- earners.
X. ZERO-RATING AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In the Danish and international debates, it has been suggested that support for
market-based service production could be given by introducing a zero VAT rate
on consumer services (or by simply exempting firms in this sector from VAT). It
is therefore of some interest to simulate the effects of such a policy measure.
It is also relevant to test the sensitivity of our results to changes in strategic
parameter values that are surrounded by uncertainty. In Table 4, we have chosen
to illustrate the welfare effects of eliminating the 25 per cent rate of VAT on
consumer services, under alternative assumptions regarding the magnitude of the
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply to the white labour market with
respect to the after-tax real wage rate. In our model, this elasticity can vary either
as a result of variations in the assumed elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure, or as a result of variations in the amount of home
production and black labour performed in the initial equilibrium. The higher the
initial level of activity in the informal economy, the greater the scope for a
reallocation of labour towards the formal economy in response to a higher
official labour market wage rate, and hence the greater the wage elasticity of
labour supply, ceteris paribus.
TABLE 4
Welfare Effects of Introducing a Zero Rate of VAT on Consumer Services, under
Alternative Assumptions regarding the Uncompensated Wage Elasticity of Labour
Supply (Flex-Wage Model)
a
Source of variation in labour supply elasticity Implicit labour supply elasticity
0.05 0.1 0.2
Variation in the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure
0.32 0.35 0.41
Variation in the initial size of the informal
economy
0.11 0.35 0.90
a The welfare gains are measured as a percentage of private consumption. The figures assume that the revenue
shortfall is neutralised by an increase in indirect taxes on other goods and services.Fiscal Studies
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Table 4 assumes that the revenue lost through the zero-rating of consumer
services must be recouped through higher indirect tax rates on other goods and
services. The central scenario in the table, with an implicit labour supply
elasticity of 0.1, corresponds to the calibration of the model used in the previous
simulation experiments. By comparison with Table 3, we see that elimination of
VAT on consumer services will have a smaller positive welfare effect than the
optimal wage subsidy of 28 per cent. In part, this reflects the fact that abolition
of the 25 per cent VAT will only lower the relative consumer price of services
by 20 per cent on impact, whereas the optimal wage subsidy will in principle
reduce white service prices by 28 per cent. An additional reason for the lower
welfare effect in Table 4 is that the wage subsidy is ‘cheaper’ in terms of
revenue loss, because it only subsidises the marginal production cost, whereas
VAT zero-rating also subsidises the inframarginal overhead costs, as we
explained in Section VIII.
It can be seen that the welfare effects are not very sensitive to variations in
the assumed degree of substitutability of consumption and leisure. On the other
hand, Table 4 reveals that the effects are fairly sensitive to the assumptions
regarding the relative size of the informal economy in the initial equilibrium.
The greater the initial amount of green and black activity, the greater the
potential welfare gains from subsidisation of white services. This finding
underscores the usefulness of additional empirical research on the extent of
informal economic activity.
In Frederiksen et al. (1994), we have also analysed how the effects of service
subsidies depend on the assumed elasticity of substitution between consumer
services and other goods which influences the price elasticity of service demand.
This analysis indicated that our results are not very sensitive to changes in this
parameter. For instance, the welfare gain from VAT zero-rating varies between
0.31 per cent and 0.42 per cent of private consumption as the implicit relative
price elasticity of service demand varies between 0.5 and 1.5.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we have reported some simulation results from the first generation
of a computable general equilibrium model designed to illustrate the effects of
subsidising those consumer services that compete most directly with services
produced in the home and in the black market. Not surprisingly, it turned out that
the employment and welfare effects of such subsidies depend crucially on the
workings of the white labour market. If the consumer real wage is rigid and the
initial level of involuntary unemployment is high, there seems to be scope for
considerable employment and welfare gains through subsidisation of consumer
services, even if the subsidies have to be financed by distortionary taxes. On the
other hand, if the real wage is fully flexible, adjusting to eliminate involuntarySubsidising Consumer Services
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unemployment over time, the long-run gains from subsidisation appear to be
much more modest.
While our fix-wage model may have some relevance for the shorter term and
the flex-wage model may shed some light on longer-run tendencies, neither of
our two labour market scenarios seems fully realistic. Moreover, the labour
market in the present versions of our model is highly aggregated and does not
highlight the important distinction between high-skilled and low-skilled labour.
In ongoing research, we are therefore elaborating on the modelling of the
labour market, introducing a distinction between a market for high-skilled
‘insider’ workers, where wage-setting tends to ensure full employment, and a
market for low-skilled workers, who tend to suffer from involuntary
unemployment because of a rigid, flat wage structure. Such a stylised model of
the labour market falls between the two extremes considered in this paper and is
consistent with the observation that the incidence of unemployment tends to be
much higher among low-skilled workers.
We are also currently working to introduce capital inputs explicitly into the
model to study how taxes and subsidies affect the intersectoral allocation of
capital in addition to their impact on labour allocation. In this context, we
distinguish between housing capital and business capital, and we introduce
separate formal and informal markets for repair and maintenance of owner-
occupied housing. This is important for two reasons. First, a subsidy to housing
repair might generate efficiency losses by exacerbating the existing distortion in
favour of housing consumption implied by the favourable tax treatment of
owner-occupied housing. Second, the skill composition of labour input in
housing repair and maintenance differs significantly from that in the rest of the
consumer service sector, with a relatively high proportion of skilled workers in
the housing maintenance sector.
Yet another topic for future work would be to study the implications of
assuming imperfect substitutability between white, green and black services.
By undertaking such extensions of our model, it should be possible to obtain
more reliable estimates of the effects of subsidising consumer services.
However, despite its simplicity, we hope that the first-generation model
presented in this paper has been of some use by indicating how one could model
the interaction between the formal and informal economies to gain a better
understanding of the effects of taxes and subsidies on resource allocation and
welfare in a service-producing economy.
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